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1. Introduction. We present an experiment investigating the interpretation of
conditionals whose antecedents contain a scalar item.1 At issue was whether these
antecedent clauses received a strengthened interpretation consistent with the generation
of an embedded scalar implicature. It is accepted that the occurrence of scalar
implicatures in this environment is variable (Levinson 2000, Fox, Chierchia and Spector
2011); but to date there has been no systematic investigation of the factors governing this
variability, although various suggestions have been made (see Geurts 2009 and Fox et al.
2011). This experiment explores the proposal in Simons 2010 that the choice of
strengthened vs. unstrengthened readings depends on the relative plausibility of each
reading. Geurts 2009 further suggests that scalar strengthenings of antecedents involve a
process distinct from that responsible for scalar implicatures in unembedded cases.
Through the use of a think-aloud protocol, we provide some evidence that this is the case.
2. Methodology. The experiment consisted of a questionnaire presented in an online
format but completed in the presence of the experimenter. Each questionnaire item
presented an utterance, with the utterance content briefly described (e.g. "The operating
manual for a piece of machinery says: If the Z-plate is warm, turn the S-dial counter-
clockwise."). The 15 target items were conditionals whose antecedent contained the
scalars some, sometimes or warm. Of these, 2 were examples which, by virtue of their
content and context, the experimenters judged to be most plausible under a strengthened
reading of the antecedent (S-prompts); 4 were examples which we judged most plausible
under an unstrengthened reading (U-prompts); 6 were "neutral" examples for which
context and content provided no deciding information (N-prompts, see example above); 3
were coherent only given a strengthened reading of the antecedent, e.g.:  If we give an
extension to some of the students, the others will be upset (TF-prompts). In addition to the
target stimuli, participants were presented with 12 control items in which a scalar item
occurred in a simple clause with no operators. 12 distractor items were also included. For
each utterance presented, participants were asked to respond with yes, no or I don’t know
to a question of the form "Did the speaker mean S?", where S was an explicit paraphrase
of the strengthened reading of the target sentence.
Participants (n=26) were also asked to "think aloud" as they decided how to
answer the question. Audio recordings were made of the entire session, and the responses
were subsequently coded for the following features:
 H: Participant references a higher item on the scale (e.g. all or most rather than
some, hot rather than warm, or always rather than sometimes).
 L: Participant references an item lower on the same scale (e.g. lukewarm as an
alternative to warm ; a few as an alternative to some) or an item on the
                                                 
1 This experiment was conducted as part of the primary author's master's thesis, under the
supervision of the secondary author and David Danks at Carnegie Mellon University. A
link to the full thesis is provided in the references.
2corresponding inverse scale (e.g. cool/cold as an alternative to warm; never as an
alternative to sometimes).
 A: Participant references alternate utterance the speaker might have made instead
of the utterance given in the prompt.
 P: Participant considers possible alternate states of the world (alternate scenarios
to that given in the prompt)
 CS: Participant explicitly exhibits sensitivity to context, either by making
reference to his/her own general world knowledge, embellishing the context
beyond what is given in the prompt, and/or saying that he/she lacks necessary
contextual information.
3. Primary Results. Participants' judgments on the target items largely accorded with
those of the experimenters, supporting the hypothesis that strengthening in antecedents is
governed by general considerations of plausibility. TF-prompts and S-prompts were
assigned a strengthened reading in the majority of instances (TF = 93.6%, S = 73.1%), far
more than U-prompts (33.7%) or N-prompts (37.8%). Embedding had a clear effect on
strengthening; e.g. for some, in the unembedded (control) prompts 96.2% were
strengthened, while in the embedded (target) prompts only 50.8% were strengthened.
Table 1 below presents the full distribution of responses.
Table 1 Yes No I don't know
Some 50.8% 45.4% 3.8%
Sometimes 64.6% 33.1% 2.3%
Target
Warm 42.3% 48.5% 9.2%
Some 96.2% 1.9% 1.9%
Sometimes 91.3% 6.7% 1.9%
Control
Warm 35.6% 58.7% 5.8%
     The think-alouds revealed a difference in reasoning about scalars in antecedents vs.
simple sentences.  In reasoning about simple sentences, participants showed a reasonably
strong tendency (41.7% of responses) to make reference to an alternate utterance
containing a higher item in the scale (coded as H&A), in line with Gricean reasoning. An
example of this reasoning is shown below:
Example 1: H&A responses
 I'm going to say yes, because if all of them had she would have said that.
(subject 101)
 Yes. She would say all the chickens laid the eggs if that's what she wanted
to say. (subject 109)
In contrast, when interpreting scalars in antecedents, only 10.8% of responses made
reference to an alternative utterance. Instead, participants tended to consider an alternate
3situation (coded as H&P). H&P reasoning was identified in 36.9% of responses to
conditional items, but in only 4.2% of responses to control items. As an example of H&P
reasoning, consider:
Example 2: H&P response
 I will say "no," because his mother would probably be ecstatic and read
him several stories if he picked up all of his toys, and what she's really
saying is if you pick up at least some of them [the toys]. (subject 101)
The distribution of H&A vs. H&P reasoning is shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2 H&A H&P
Target 10.8% 36.9%
Control 41.7% 4.2%
As shown by the example above, H&P reasoning took the form of evaluating whether the
situation described by the consequent of the conditional would plausibly continue to hold
in an alternate situation; specifically, the situation corresponding to the one excluded on
the strengthened interpretation of the antecedent. If this was the case, then the
strengthened reading of the conditional was typically rejected. While H&A reasoning in
control items reliably led to a strengthened interpretation (100% of the responses that
exhibited this reasoning in the control prompts were given a strengthened reading), this
was not the case for the H&P reasoning in the target items: amongst the responses that
exhibited this reasoning in the target prompts, 39.1% received a strengthened reading and
56.4% received an unstrengthened reading. An example of this variation is given below:
Example 3: Variation in Responses to Target Prompts
 Yes, 'cause … maybe not. Okay, so, if some of them [fail the exam], you'll
give extra credit, but if all of them … he might do something else. Okay,
so yeah, it is saying the same thing. (subject 102)
 I think that if all of the students failed then he would also give an extra
credit assignment, so I'll disagree. If some, or all – it's the same idea here.
(subject 105)
4. Additional Results. Participants’ responses to the control prompts revealed an
unexpected variation in the behavior of the various scalars under investigation. We
discovered that warm is significantly less robust than some or sometimes. Control
prompts with some or sometimes were strengthened over 90% of the time, whereas only
435.6% of the control prompts with warm received a strengthened interpretation. Warm
turned out to be susceptible to a number of different contextual factors, the most striking
feature of which was the salience of cold or cool. Subjects frequently referred to cold or
cool in response to items containing the scalar warm (L responses occurred in 43.8% of
the control prompts containing warm and in 33.3% of the target prompts containing
warm), whereas they rarely referred to none or never in reference to some or sometimes
(range: 8.3-0%, depending on the type of prompt). Warm was also seen to be sensitive to
a variety of other unexpected contextual factors. One of the unexpected factors was the
speaker's inability to guarantee that warm will not become hot. The idea seemed to be
that because the speaker cannot guarantee that the temperature will not go from warm to
hot, the speaker cannot mean warm but not hot. Subjects were also influenced in one
prompt by the mention of the fact that a sweater was someone's favorite ("Cindy is
putting on her favorite blue sweater. She says to her mother: This sweater keeps me warm
on winter days."). The idea seemed to be that the sweater wouldn't be Cindy's favorite if
it made her hot, so Cindy must mean that the sweater keeps her warm but not hot on
winter days.
5. Conclusions. While the experiment described here is rather unsophisticated, it
produces results which indicate that further work in the directions suggested here are
worthwhile. For the study of embedded vs. unembedded scalar inferences, the experiment
suggests that the type of pragmatic reasoning involved in the two cases may indeed be
different. Further work to investigate this question, not only with conditionals but with
other embedding constructions, is motivated. For the study of scalar inferences in
general, the experiment suggests that the narrow focus on the behavior of scalar
quantifiers and of or (vs. and) may be skewing theoretical discussion: our view of the
robustness of scalar inferences may change when we take into account a broader range of
scalar items. Finally, we hope that this experiment will encourage others in the use of
"think-aloud" protocols in pragmatic experimentation. As shown here, this protocol can
provide new insights into processes of pragmatic reasoning.
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